But the financial crisis changed everything

Recovering of Air France-KLM orders, last August, Pierre - Henri Gourgeon had a well plotted course: that of the "profitable growth". A strategy initiated as early as 2004, in the aftermath of the merger with KLM, based on the increase in productivity of 5 to 6 per year by the growth of the offer and taking market share. In four years, it will be enabled the group to increase its turnover and market share in Europe by two, without the slightest deficit exercise, despite the extra cost of French social charges. But the financial crisis changed everything. For the first time in its history, Air France-KLM is found without growth and even to reduce the wing. And for the first time since the great depression of Air France in 1997, its results have plunged into the red. A real shock for this company, accustomed to be carburetted at a rate of growth of 4 to 5 per year! British Airways, Lufthansa and the large American companies have all experienced similar periods of deficit and reductions in strength since the beginning of the century. But not Air France-KLM, only large company have known nor losses nor social plan over the last ten years.

The challenge posed by the current crisis is that great. Like the bike, the model Air France is doomed to fall if he ceases to move forward Or will be able to adapt to the absence of growth without putting into question the guarantee of employment The equation is simple and daunting. When the growth is zero, the cost of Air France nevertheless continue to increase mechanically 3 per year. Approximately EUR 400 million, the need to delete the result, or save elsewhere. In addition, each point of growth or decay of the offer represents approximately 600 jobs. Knowing that Air France has reduced its offer of 3.4 on the current summer season, these are some 2,000 jobs found in overmanning, in 2009, nothing for the French company.

But for the time being, Directorate of Air France-KLM has not called into question the social pact. Despite the prospect of at least two loss-making exercises and three years of growth zero, by 2011, "graduated response" said plan excludes always resort to layoffs. Also the conventional measures of internal mobility and reductions of the CSD and is acting, its social component based primarily on the gel of hirings and the replacement of natural attrition, leading to a mechanical reduction of the order of 2 per year. Thus since last summer, some 2,000 departures have not been replaced in the Air France group, including 1,000 in Air France. In total, more than 5,000 positions should thus disappear in Air France by 2011, without dismissal on a workforce of approximately 75.281 employees at end of March.

This enough If traffic remains on track last month swoop ( 9.4), the answer is clearly no. Very abundant cash, Air France-KLM can certainly afford to temporarily support of overmanning. But the scenario of a return to the balance via a natural reduction is based on the assumption of a stagnation of the offer on the next two fiscal years, which implies an improvement in the situation of the traffic in the second half. The Association of international air transportation (Iata) predicts a decline of 5.7 of the traffic in 2009 and sees no improvement before late 2009, early 2010.

To succeed his bet, Air France-KLM must therefore do a little better than its main competitors, by retrieving a portion of the traffic dropped by the more poorly bearing companies. It reached so far. Its traffic over one year remains still slightly positive ( 0.8 in passenger-kilometres transported). The group can count on his double hub"system of Roissy and Amsterdam the most powerful in Europe in the number of matches to retrieve traffic abandoned by companies more poorly in point. When SAS closes its Copenhagen-Seattle line, lack of profitability, a part of the customer is found on the Paris-Seattle of Air France. A condition that the company is able to offer a competitive rate, which brings back to the problem of productivity per employee and the reduction of the costs. To keep, Air France should ensure that the evolution of costs remains similar to what it is among its competitors, under penalty of being led in sales at a loss. However these competitors do not necessarily have the same reticence with regard to the dismissals, as US companies, which have all already announced reductions in numbers of the order of 10. The balance looks so difficult to find for the French group between the maintenance of the social pact and the reconciliation of accounts.